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ABSTRACT
The main focus of the paper is to analyze the effects of both economic and political variables 
on public sector budget deficits. The econometric results show that the main determinants of 
budget deficits include international capital inflow, international interest rate, debt service 
costs, public expenditure, political instability and economic growth. The author makes the 
following recommendations. Firstly, international capital should be used to finance projects 
that contribute meaningfully to the economy. Secondly, since international interest rate is 
outside the control of Nigeria’s government and monetary authorities, emphasis on foreign 
loans should be reduced. Thirdly, government should avoid external debt where necessary. 
Fourthly, government should increase her spending on infrastructural development. 
Furthermore, government should strengthen the political institutions including the judiciary, 
as well as create a level playing ground for all its citizens, so as to promote political stability. 
Moreover, government should give more incentives and subsidies such as low corporate profit 
tax, improvement in power and energy generation, etc., in order to encourage producers 
as well as promote economic growth. Lastly, government should sustain the on-going war 
against corruption so that public funds are not misappropriated or embezzled by government 
officials.      
Keywords: public deficits, political instability, economic growth, public expenditure.
 1. INTRODUCTION
The persistent high budget deficits and the 
resultant increase in debt in developed and 
developing countries (including Nigeria) 
has motivated scholars in the fields of 
economics and political science to examine 
the likely factors (that is, economic, 
political, and institutional) that drive public 
sector budget deficits. Whereas economic 
theory postulates that economic boom leads 
to decline in budget deficits, this has not 
been the case as deficits continued to rise 
even after prosperity (Ali Bayar and Bram 
Smeets, 2009). The rise in budget deficits 
has partly been attributed to policy shifts 
planned by policy makers and the shocks in 
international and domestic variables which 
policy makers cannot influence (Marshall 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1989). 
In the Nigeria’s context, fiscal policy has 
tended to favour huge budget deficits, 
occasioned by the need to finance public 
(utilities) projects that government revenues 
are unable to finance. To this end, successive 
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of GDP moved from -10.79 percentage 
in 1970 to -39.20 percentage in 1993 and 
-91.33 percentage in 1999. The percentage of 
deficits in GDP was put at -69.58 percentage 
in 2002, -28.72 percentage in 2005 and 
-7.02 percentage in 2008 (see appendix 
1). In summary, despite the huge revenue 
generated from sales of crude oil, public 
sector deficits remain high in Nigeria.
The continuous accumulation of high 
budget deficits has re-shaped the thinking 
of researchers, as they attempt to analyze 
budget deficits from not only economic but 
also political and institutional perspectives 
(Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, 2009). Some 
of the political and institutional variables 
include government’s ideology, size of 
government, party system fragmentation, 
electoral cycles, presidential budgetary 
power, and the degree of public sector 
decentralization. Following the issues raised 
above, the main objective of this paper is 
to empirically examine the political and 
economic determinants of budget deficits in 
Nigeria.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 
one is the introduction, while section two 
contains the literature review and theoretical 
framework. Section three consists of model 
specification and estimation, while section 
four discusses the results and policy 
implications of findings. Section five is for 
recommendations and conclusion.             
II. LITERATURE REvIEw 
     AND THEORETICAL 
     FRAMEwORk
Several researchers have examined 
the economic and political (including 
institutional) determinants of public sector 
governments resorted to various forms of 
deficit financing, through domestic and 
foreign borrowing, as well as printing of 
money. These practices led to accumulation 
of high debt, especially in the 1980s and 
1990s. Couple with this, was the international 
shocks that resulted from declining oil 
prices and rising international interest rates, 
as well as declining inflows of international 
capital. The international shocks were soon 
felt in the domestic economy. For instance, 
falling oil prices and inadequate inflows 
of international capital led to decrease in 
government revenues. Besides, the increase 
in international interest rates had severe 
consequences on the economy as the interest 
payment on external debt increased the costs 
of debt servicing. These further re-enforce 
huge government debt and deficits. In 
order to resolve the crises and ensure fiscal 
adjustment, the federal government adopted 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
in 1986. This amongst others was to reduce 
excessive (and unnecessary) government 
spending and to increase its revenue. 
In spite of government’s efforts, Nigeria’s 
fiscal performance worsened during the 
period 1970-2008. For instance, budget 
deficits increased (deteriorated) from 
–N455.10million in 1970 to -2,821.90million 
in 1978 and –N8,254.30million in 1986. 
Following the introduction of SAP 
in 1986, budget deficits worsened to 
-22,116.10million and -285,104.70million 
in 1990 and 1999, respectively. The 
increase in budget deficits continued as 
it reached a peak of -301,401.60million 
in 2002. However, government deficits 
improved declining to –N172,601.30million 
in 2004, -N101,397.50million in 2006 and 
–N47,378.50million in 2008 (see appendix 
1). Moreover, budget deficits as a percentage 
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budget deficits. For example, Ali Bayar 
and Bram Smeets (2009) examined the 
economic, political as well as institutional 
determinants of budget deficits in the 
European Union for the period 1971-
2006. The authors discovered that political 
fragmentation has no significant impact on 
public deficits, while partisan behaviour has 
a negligible impact on government deficits. 
However, they confirmed that political 
instability has a significant negative effect 
on government budget deficits. In Philippine, 
Diokno (2007) used both narrowest and 
broader measurement of fiscal deficits in 
his analysis. Using the narrowest measure 
of fiscal deficit, the author indicated that 
inflation, domestic liquidity, capital outlays 
and tax effort are the main determinants of 
public deficits. On the other hand, the author 
used a broader measure of fiscal deficit, and 
discovered that the important determinants 
of budget balance include economic growth, 
inflation, domestic liquidity, capital outlays, 
intergovernmental transfers and tax effort. 
On their part, Ellis and Schansberg (1999) 
focused on the determinants of fiscal deficit 
at the state level. The authors showed that 
high proportion of young voters is associated 
with high deficit. On the contrary, a large 
proportion of elderly voters was found 
to be related to lower deficit. Lastly, the 
authors illustrated that political factors are 
not important in explaining deficit at state 
level. 
In Turkey, Yesim Kustepeli and Gulcan 
Onel (2005) evaluated the effects of 
political (parties) fragmentation on fiscal 
deficits during the period 1976-2004. The 
results revealed that the most important 
determinants of deficits is its lagged 
value. Moreover, the number of political 
parties in the government in power shows 
a little impact. The authors concluded that 
polarization, fragmentation and ideology of 
government have no significant influence 
on fiscal deficits. In Cote D’Ivoire, Oussou 
Kouassy and Bouabre Bohoun (1993) 
concentrated on the determinants of fiscal 
deficit and fiscal adjustment. The regression 
results indicate that public investment has 
a positive relationship with fiscal deficit. 
Similarly, tax rates are positively correlated 
to fiscal deficit. However, the GDP was 
shown to have a negative relationship with 
budget deficit. Roubini (1991) reported 
that fiscal deficits are partly determined by 
political factors and/or political instability. 
He concluded that increase in the degree of 
political instability appears to lead to greater 
budget deficits.
Peter Calgagno and Monica Escaleras (2005) 
used the index of political alternation (IPA) 
to measure political instability in the U.S. 
states. Their results revealed that political 
alternation creates instability which in turn 
has negative effect on fiscal performance in 
the U.S. states. In their work, Ali Salman 
Saleh and Charles Harvie (2005) advised 
that reducing government deficit can 
improve standard of living of the people. 
Unfortunately, due to political interferences, 
corruption, inadequate and inefficient 
governance system, it is difficult to adjust 
fiscal deficit in Lebanon. In Latin America, 
Acosta and Coppedge (2001) reported that 
large deficits are associated with election 
years. Secondly, the establishment of 
institutions designed to reduce deficits 
are important in reducing deficits. Other 
determinants of government deficits include 
size of the president’s party, its degree of 
discipline, its loyalty to the president and 
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the ideological position of the president. 
Mika Tujula and Guido Wolswijk (2004) 
showed that growth of government debt, 
macroeconomic development and political 
variables are the major determinants of 
budget balances in OECD countries. In 
addition, asset prices have been shown to be 
useful in explaining changes in government 
budget, but the effect is little. Marcela 
Eslava (2006) examined the effect of three 
possible determinants of fiscal balance, 
namely opportunistic behaviuor of policy 
makers, heterogeneous fiscal preferences of 
either voters or politicians, and the budget 
institutions. The author observed that less-
fragmented governments and ability of 
voters to influence government fiscal policy 
tend to reduce budget deficits. Besides, the 
intervention of court in determining fiscal 
policy in order to increase spending so as to 
ensure constitutional rights leads to higher 
deficits. Roubini and Sachs (1989) examined 
the effects of structure of governments and 
political party fragmentation on government 
deficits. They found that higher number of 
political parties in government in power 
tend to raise budget deficits. In addition, 
in countries where government tenure is 
short, budget deficits tend to be large. Mink 
and De Haan (2005) confirmed that public 
sector deficits are higher in election years, 
while they remain low in the years preceding 
election.  
In their work, Luca Agnello and Ricardo 
Sousa (2009) investigated the determinants 
of public deficit volatility. The authors 
illustrated that high level of political 
instability and less-democracy raise public 
sector deficit volatility. Furthermore, 
government deficit volatility is greater 
for small economies experiencing hyper-
inflation as well as those with high degree of 
openness. Some studies such as Aristovnik 
(2006) and Srdjan Redzepagic and 
Matthiew Llorca (2007) focused on fiscal 
sustainability.        
Theoretical Framework
In his ‘tax-smoothing’ theory, Barro (1979) 
argued that, in an attempt to minimize 
distortions resulting from tax rates changes, 
government usually influence the size of 
budget deficits (or budget surplus). In order 
to maintain a balance or equilibrium in 
its expenditure and revenue, government 
employs a policy of budget deficit or 
surplus. On his part, Diokno (2007) opined 
that government runs deficits when national 
income is low or when government purchases 
are large. Thus, economic theory assigns 
an important role to temporary changes in 
revenue and expenditure in the explanation of 
budget deficit or surplus. However, Alesina 
and Perotti (1995) asserted that economic 
theory alone is inadequate in explaining 
changes in budget deficit, and therefore 
advised that both political and institutional 
factors be taken into consideration when 
discussing deficit issues. Supporting this 
claim, Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets (2009) 
pointed out that the tax-smoothing theory 
fails to explain the persistent deficits that 
accompanied the oil shocks of the 1970s.         
III. Model Specification and Estimation
This paper uses the standard econometric 
model that has its basis from Roubini and 
Sachs (1989), and later adopted by Yesim 
Kustepeli and Gulcan Onel (2005). The model 
is used to analyze the effects of economic 
and political factors on public sector budget 
deficits. The model expresses budget 
deficits (BUD) as a function of international 
capital inflow (CAP), international interest 
rate (INTRAT), inflation rate (INF), debt 
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States LIBOR rate. INF refers to inflation 
rate. DEBT is captured by the ratio of debt 
service costs to GDP. PUBEX refers to 
public expenditure on infrastructure like 
roads, energy/power, communications, etc. 
The variable is measured as the ratio of 
public expenditure to GDP. ECGR refers 
to economic growth, and it is captured by 
the growth of gross domestic product. POL 
is captured by dummy, where D=1 is for 
military regime and D=0 for civilian rule. U 
is the error term.
Prior to estimation of the econometric model 
above, the author performed stationarity 
(unit root) test on the variables. This is 
done to avoid the generation of spurious 
(misleading) regression results. To this 
service costs (DEBT), public expenditure 
(PUBEX), economic growth (ECGR) and 
political variables (POL). Due to many 
years of military rule in Nigeria, the paper 
considers only military regime and civilian 
rule as the political variables. The model is 
specified as:
BUDt = CAPt + INTRATt + INFt + 
DEBTt + PUBEXt + POLt + ECGR+ 
Ut……………….. (1)
The variables are measured as follows. 
BUD is measured as budget deficits/
surplus-GDP ratio. CAP is the captured by 
the ratio of international capital inflows to 
GDP. INTRAT refers to the international 
interest rate, and is captured by the United 
Table 1: Stationarity (unit root) test for variables
 Variables  ADF-Statistic Critical values Order of integration
BUD  -7.097670
(0.0000)
1%= -2.628961
5%= -1.950117
10%= -1.611339
 Stationary at first
difference
CAP -5.086592
(0.0000)
1%= -2.628961
5%= -1.950117
10%= -1.611339
 Stationary at first
difference
INTRAT -3.987412
(0.0003)
1%= -2.647120
5%= -1.952910
10%= -1.610011
 Stationary at first
difference
INF -6.077794
(0.0000)
1%= -2.630762
5%= -1.950394
10%= -1.611202
 Stationary at first
difference
DEBT -7.817795
(0.0000)
1%= -2.628961
5%= -1.950117
10%= -1.611339
 Stationary at first
difference
PUBEXP -9.285380
(0.0000)
1%= -2.628961
5%= -1.950117
10%= -1.611339
 Stationary at first
difference
POL -6.000000
(0.0000)
1%= -2.628961
5%= -1.950117
10%= -1.611339
 Stationary at first
difference
ECGR -5.686236
(0.0000)
1%= -2.628961
5%= -1.950117
10%= -1.611339
Stationary at level
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end, the author employed the Augmented 
Dicker-Fuller (ADF) statistic. The result of 
stationarity test of the variables is shown in 
the table below.
The stationarity test indicates that all the 
variables are stationary at first difference, 
except economic growth which is stationary 
at level. Finally, the result of the regression 
exercise is shown in the table below: 
Iv.  DISCUSSION OF  
       RESULTS AND POLICy 
       IMPLICATIONS OF 
      FINDINGS
The regression results indicate that 
the explanatory variables account for 
approximately 78.3 percentage changes 
in budget deficits in Nigeria. The Durbin 
Watson statistic (1.87) illustrates the absence 
of auto correlation. The F-statistic (9.91) 
indicates that the explanatory variables are 
jointly significant and capable of explaining 
changes in budget deficits. The estimation 
also reveals that international capital inflow 
has a significant positive association with 
budget deficits. A 1 percentage increase in 
international capital in the previous one 
year causes budget deficits to increase by 
 Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: BUD
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/21/09   Time: 12:57
Sample(adjusted): 1977 2007
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.
C -65.67526 14.90410 -4.406524 0.0002
CAP(-1) 102.6803 37.74196 2.720587 0.0125
INTRAT 5.631216 1.317415 4.274443 0.0003
INF -0.084325 0.153809 -0.548244 0.5890
DEBT(-1) 39.42674 19.41710 2.030517 0.0546
PUBEX -110.0985 21.57601 -5.102819 0.0000
POL(-1) 18.76174 6.542847 2.867519 0.0089
ECGR -0.061013 0.030836 -1.978620 0.0605
ECM(-1) 0.522315 0.202361 2.581102 0.0170
R-squared 0.782776     Mean dependent var -17.79581
Adjusted R-squared 0.703785     S.D. dependent var 23.85517
S.E. of regression 12.98332     Akaike info criterion 8.202908
Sum squared resid 3708.462     Schwarz criterion 8.619227
Log likelihood -118.1451     F-statistic 9.909745
Durbin-Watson stat 1.869424     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000010
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approximately 102.68 percentage. Thus, 
the higher the capacity of Nigeria to attract 
international capital, the more the deficits 
government accumulates. Despite the huge 
foreign capital going to the oil sector of 
the economy, government budget deficits 
remain high. This may be due partly to the 
rising demand for public utilities. Moreover, 
the results show that international interest 
rate has a significant positive relationship 
with budget deficits. A 1 percentage increase 
in international rate leads to an increase 
in budget deficits by approximately 5.63 
percentage. Thus, higher international 
interest rate tends to raise interest payments 
on external loans, thereby leading to higher 
debt accumulation and budget deficits. 
Furthermore, the estimation shows that debt 
service has a significant positive relationship 
with budget deficits. A 1 percentage increase 
in debt service in the previous one year raises 
budget deficits by approximately 39.43 
percentage. This implies that accumulation 
of government debt will lead to higher 
budget deficits. This is a reflection of the 
Nigerian state, where government’s planned 
expenditure always outstrips government’s 
planned revenue. To fill the gap between 
expenditure and revenue, government often 
resorts to budget deficits (deficit financing). 
In most cases, a large proportion of Nigeria’s 
budget has been used to finance her debt 
liabilities. In addition, the results show 
that public expenditure (on infrastructure) 
has a significant negative relationship with 
budget deficits. A 1 percentage increase in 
public expenditure reduces budget deficits 
by approximately 110.10 percentage. Thus, 
if public expenditure is used to finance 
infrastructural development, it will lead to 
low transactions and production costs as 
well as increase profitability of producers or 
manufacturers, thereby raising government 
(tax) revenue generation and reducing 
her deficits. Another discovery from the 
estimation is that political instability has a 
significant positive association with budget 
deficits. A 1 percentage increase in political 
instability in the previous one year leads to an 
increase in budget deficits by approximately 
18.76 percentage. Thus, a situation where 
there is frequent change in government, 
the tendency to spend more by the new 
government is always very high. The results 
also indicate that economic growth has 
significant negative relationship with budget 
deficits. A 1 percentage increase in economic 
growth results to a decrease in budget 
deficits by approximately 0.06 percentage. 
Thus, if higher economic growth results to 
an increase in government revenue it will 
reduce the propensity to borrow, thereby 
leading to reduction in budget deficits. 
Lastly, the error correction variable has 
been shown to be significant and positive, 
indicating that there is a divergence between 
actual and desired levels of budget deficits.  
v.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
     AND CONCLUSION
From the discussion above, the author 
makes the following recommendations. 
Firstly, in as much as we cannot over-
emphasize the importance of international 
capital, government should make sure that 
such funds are used judiciously to finance 
projects that will contribute meaningfully to 
the economy. Recent revelation has shown 
that massive corruption is on-going in 
government agencies like Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, Power Holding 
Company of Nigeria, and the Nigeria Ports 
Authority to mention just few. To check this, 
government should increase its investment 
in anti-corruption agencies like Economic 
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and Financial Crime Commission and 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission. 
Secondly, since international interest rate is 
outside the control of Nigeria’s government 
and monetary authorities, emphasis on 
foreign loans should be reduced. The huge 
debt stock and budget deficits in Nigeria 
are attributable partly to high international 
interest rate. Thirdly, government should 
avoid external debt where necessary, 
because a large proportion of the nation’s 
deficit financing goes into repayment of 
debt accumulated in the past. Fourthly, 
government should increase her spending on 
infrastructural development, which includes 
roads, communications, power, energy 
and so on. This would reduce transactions 
and production costs and raise profitability 
of firms, as well as increase government 
(tax) revenue generation. Furthermore, 
government should strengthen the political 
institutions including the judiciary, and 
create a level playing ground for all citizens, 
so as to promote and sustain political 
stability. Moreover, government should give 
incentives and subsidies to producers in 
order to encourage production of goods and 
services. These incentives include among 
others low corporate profit tax, improvement 
in power and energy generation, etc. 
In addition, we advise for proper 
management of both political and economic 
institutions in order to check deficits from 
rising, and government should secure more 
favourable interest rates on its debt so as to 
reduce future burden. These and many others 
would help to reduce government deficits. 
Lastly, although this paper contributes to the 
literature by examining the economic and 
political determinants of budget deficits, 
the author suggests that future research in 
this area should consider variables such as 
government’s ideology, size of government, 
party system fragmentation, electoral cycles, 
presidential budgetary power, and the degree 
of public sector decentralization.
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Appendix 1: Government budget deficits/surplus, real GDP, and percentage share of 
budget deficits in GDP.
Years
Fiscal deficits/surplus
(Nm)
Real Gross domestic 
product
(Nm)
Fiscal deficits/surplus 
as a percentage of 
GDP (%)
1970 -455.1 4,219.00 -10.79
1971 171.6 4,715.50 3.64
1972 -58.8 4,892.80 -1.20
1973 166.1 5,310.00 3.13
1974 1,796.40 15,919.70 11.28
1975 -427.9 27,172.00 -1.57
1976 -1,090.80 29,146.50 -3.74
1977 -781.4 31,520.30 -2.48
1978 -2,821.90 29,212.40 -9.66
1979 1,461.70 29,948.00 4.88
1980 -1,975.20 31,546.80 -6.26
1981 -3,902.10 205,222.10 -1.90
1982 -6,104.10 199,685.30 -3.06
1983 -3,364.50 185,598.10 -1.81
1984 -2,660.40 183,563.00 -1.45
1985 -3,039.70 201,036.30 -1.51
1986 -8,254.30 205,971.40 -4.01
1987 -5,889.70 204,806.50 -2.88
1988 -12,160.90 219,875.60 -5.53
1989 -15,134.70 236,729.60 -6.39
1990 -22,116.10 267,550.00 -8.27
1991 -35,755.20 265,379.10 -13.47
1992 -39,532.50 271,365.50 -14.57
1993 -107,735.30 274,833.30 -39.20
1994 -70,270.60 275,450.60 -25.51
1995 1,000.00 281,407.40 0.36
1996 32,049.40 293,745.40 10.91
1997 -5,000.00 302,022.50 -1.66
1998 -133,389.30 310,890.10 -42.91
1999 -285,104.70 312,183.50 -91.33
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2000 -103,777.30 329,178.70 -31.53
2001 -221,048.90 356,994.30 -61.92
2002 -301,401.60 433,203.50 -69.58
2003 -202,724.70 477,533.00 -42.45
2004 -172,601.30 527,576.00 -32.72
2005 -161,406.30 561,931.40 -28.72
2006 -101,397.50 595,821.60 -17.02
2007 -117.20 634,251.10 -0.02
2008 -47,378.50 674,889.00 -7.02
Source: columns 2 and 3 Central Bank of Nigeria (2008), column 4 (author’s computation)
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